AI routing and the linguistic air-lock
AI routing, as it exists today, is the mechanism by which service-slm — the Doorman — mediates every request that involves a language model, across three compute tiers. service-slm is the sole boundary that holds external-model credentials and logs every call to the per-tenant audit ledger; no other component in the system holds external AI credentials or makes direct outbound calls to external language models.
This platform does not scrub personally identifiable information or location data from a prompt before an external call. The only sanitization code on the platform today is a credential redactor: it removes secrets — private keys, API tokens, generic bearer/secret/password patterns — and it runs solely on the path that writes training examples into the learning corpus, never on the path to an external model.
This is a compliance-relevant gap, not a cosmetic one, for regulated-industry readers — real estate, financial advisory, clinics, law firms — evaluating the platform's privacy protections. The honest current answer: when Tier C goes live, raw customer text will reach an external model unless a PII-scrubbing mechanism is built first. The credential redactor protects secrets, not customer data.
What's real today
- Three compute tiers: Tier A (local), Tier B (Yo-Yo burst/GPU), Tier C (external API).
- Model names: Tier A runs
olmo-3-7b-instructlocally; Tier B (Yo-Yo) defaults toOlmo-3-1125-32B-Think. - Tier C is not live. The client is wired only against a test mock, and every call is gated behind a fixed, compile-time allowlist.
- Every proxied call is audit-logged, with cost and response recorded to the audit ledger.
- Every request carries a mandatory tenant tag.
- No per-tenant budget cap gates routing decisions yet. Cost tracking and pricing configuration exist, but nothing currently ties a tenant's spend to a routing decision.
What is not built
PII scrubbing, location-identifier stripping, pseudonymous token substitution, and any form of rehydration mechanism are not built.
Applications — what the platform can honestly promise today
- Editorial workflow: TOPIC and GUIDE drafts that reach Tier C today do so through the fixed allowlist's narrow-precision tasks (see Learning Datagraph — SLM trajectory loop and apprenticeship queue for
draft_generate's behavior) — not through any sanitization step, because none exists for this path. - Financial advisory / real estate / clinic / law-firm use of Tier C is not yet a safe claim to make. Any of these use cases sending ledger records, client names, or property/owner records through Tier C today would reach the external model with PII unredacted. A real PII-scrubbing mechanism, independently verified, must exist before that changes.