service-fs — the WORM ledger backbone
fix(services): add dated Correction callouts to 10 of 13 services/ batch-1 articles — worst defect ratio of any category (fabricated proofreader/message-courier/chart-of-accounts mechanics, reversed egress data-flow direction, wrong Graph vs real EWS integration, wrong extraction routing model, understated service-fs capability; private-git-paid-customer-endpoint.md finding disproven, agent checked wrong crate, no correction applied; service-input.md and service-fs-data-lake.md already correctly self-corrected
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Every record written to the PointSav platform — identity anchors, email commun ## Key takeaways - `service-fs` is a WORM ledger, not a filesystem. The implemented API surface is two operations: `append` and health. The `read_since`, `checkpoint`, and proof operations are planned. - `service-fs` is a WORM ledger, not a filesystem. The implemented API surface is two operations: `append` and health. The `read_since`, `checkpoint`, and proof operations are planned. (Correction, 2026-08-02, verified against canonical `origin/main`: this understates real capability — `src/http.rs` also registers `/v1/checkpoint`, `/v1/entries`, `/v1/contract`, and `/mcp` as real, implemented routes, not planned. Flagged, not resolved.) - The ledger is per-tenant — each Totebox holds its own isolated ledger; no cross-tenant reads are possible at the storage layer. - Compliance with SEC Rule 17a-4(f), eIDAS, and SOC 2 follows from architectural properties, not configurable controls: the storage engine physically lacks the ability to delete or modify records. - Recurring Sigstore Rekor anchoring by [[fs-anchor-emitter]] creates an external, publicly verifiable timestamp chain for the entire ledger. **Verified live**: the `local-fs-anchor.timer` systemd unit is active and runs monthly (confirmed against the running system).