FS architecture and the WORM backbone
feat(wiki): editorial intake batch — 38 files across 5 source archives (infrastructure, system, gis, console, own-drafts)
@@ -3,14 +3,14 @@ schema: foundry-doc-v1 type: topic content_type: topic slug: service-fs-architecture short_description: "A per-tenant Write-Once-Read-Many immutable ledger serving as the tamper-evident backbone for all platform records, implemented as a four-layer decoupled stack with dual Linux and seL4 microkernel runtime envelopes." short_description: "A per-tenant Write-Once-Read-Many immutable ledger serving as the tamper-evident backbone for all platform records, designed as a four-layer decoupled stack with a Linux runtime envelope today and a planned seL4 microkernel envelope." title: "FS architecture and the WORM backbone" category: services audience: vendor-public bcsc_class: current-fact status: active language: en last_edited: 2026-05-08 last_edited: 2026-06-23 editor: pointsav-engineering paired_with: service-fs-architecture.es.md --- @@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ To ensure modularity and survivability, `service-fs` is implemented as a decoupl ## Dual Boot Envelopes A core design property of `service-fs` is its ability to operate across two distinct runtime envelopes using the same codebase. The [[worm-ledger-storage-architecture|WORM storage architecture]] article describes how each envelope satisfies the append-only constraint. `service-fs` is **designed** to operate across two runtime envelopes from one codebase. The [[worm-ledger-storage-architecture|WORM storage architecture]] article describes the intended storage model for each envelope. 1. **Envelope A (Current):** A Linux/BSD daemon under systemd. It uses standard POSIX file I/O and process isolation. 2. **Envelope B (Intended):** A verified [[sel4-microkernel-substrate|seL4]] Microkit Protection Domain. It is intended to use `moonshot-database` (PSDB) for capability-addressed storage, providing formally verified tenant isolation. 1. **Envelope A (Current):** A Linux/BSD daemon under systemd. It uses standard POSIX file I/O and process isolation. This is the only implemented envelope; it exposes `POST /v1/append` and `GET /healthz`. 2. **Envelope B (seL4 — deferred):** A verified [[sel4-microkernel-substrate|seL4]] Microkit Protection Domain is the planned future target. It is intended to use `moonshot-database` (PSDB) for capability-addressed storage, providing formally verified tenant isolation. Envelope B exists only as a reference entry point (`main_sel4_stub.rs`) that is not compiled into the current build. ## Durability and Compliance @@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ This architecture ensures that `service-fs` remains portable, verifiable, and re ## Key takeaways - `service-fs` is a WORM ledger, not a filesystem. Its API surface is three operations: `append`, `read_since`, `checkpoint`. - `service-fs` is a WORM ledger, not a filesystem. The implemented API surface is two operations: `append` and health. The `read_since`, `checkpoint`, and proof operations are planned. - The ledger is per-tenant — each Totebox holds its own isolated ledger; no cross-tenant reads are possible at the storage layer. - The four-layer architecture decouples wire protocol, API contract, and storage engine, so the seL4 Envelope B swap does not require rewriting the service. - Durability uses open standards: C2SP tlog-tiles (100-year readability) and C2SP signed-note Checkpoints (compact provability). - Monthly Sigstore Rekor anchoring by [[fs-anchor-emitter]] creates an external, publicly verifiable timestamp chain for the entire ledger. - The four-layer architecture is designed to decouple wire protocol, API contract, and storage engine, so the seL4 Envelope B swap does not require rewriting the service. - The target durability format is open standards: C2SP tlog-tiles (100-year readability) and C2SP signed-note Checkpoints (compact provability). The tile backend is planned; the current build uses a per-tenant JSON append log with per-payload SHA-256 digests. - Recurring Sigstore Rekor anchoring by [[fs-anchor-emitter]] is **intended** to create an external, publicly verifiable timestamp chain for the entire ledger. The anchoring operation is planned and not yet running. ## See also