os-totebox: the sovereign WORM data vault
docs(documentation): fix 147 broken wikilinks -- console-os/os-totebox word-order typos (71 occurrences), path-style syntax errors, stray topic- prefixes, PPN/os-console/service-fs/GIS alias-consolidation retargets (57 occurrences), plus 14 links converted to plain text or proper category links where no wikilink target applies (2 flagged as genuine content gaps: app-mediakit-shell has no article; mount is TOML syntax, not a slug)
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ paired_with: os-totebox-sovereign-archive.es.md category: systems status: active quality: complete last_edited: 2026-08-06 last_edited: 2026-08-24 --- **Status (2026-08-06):** the seL4 Microkit image described in this article has moved @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ These are the deployed build's current, factual limits. The boot and inference verification above is real and current; the vault's persistence, availability, and ledger-anchoring guarantees are not yet delivered. Every organisation that relies on a third-party platform to store its records is making an implicit wager: that the platform provider will remain solvent, accessible, and free of security failures for as long as those records matter. [[os-totebox]] is designed for operators who have decided that wager is unacceptable. Every organisation that relies on a third-party platform to store its records is making an implicit wager: that the platform provider will remain solvent, accessible, and free of security failures for as long as those records matter. [[totebox-os]] is designed for operators who have decided that wager is unacceptable. ## What os-totebox Is Designed To Be @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ The concrete failure scenario this is designed to defend against: if [[service-s os-totebox is designed to organise its services into two [[three-ring-architecture|concentric rings]] based on their proximity to storage, once the seL4 image lands. **Ring 1** is planned to comprise the services that interact directly with durable data and external I/O: [[service-fs-architecture|service-fs]], service-input, service-extraction, and service-egress, with service-fs holding the WORM block device capability exclusively — the only Protection Domain on the machine able to perform storage operations, with no other service able to reach the block device directly regardless of execution state. **Ring 1** is planned to comprise the services that interact directly with durable data and external I/O: [[service-fs|service-fs]], service-input, service-extraction, and service-egress, with service-fs holding the WORM block device capability exclusively — the only Protection Domain on the machine able to perform storage operations, with no other service able to reach the block device directly regardless of execution state. **Ring 2** is planned to comprise the services that process, classify, and reason about data: service-content, service-people, service-email, and service-slm, communicating with Ring 1 through a defined and bounded inter-domain communication protocol — able to request that service-fs write a record, without holding the capability to do so themselves.