os-totebox: the sovereign WORM data vault
editorial(systems): fix os-totebox-sovereign-archive duplicate H1 + narration (Track-B) — dropped body H1 duplicating frontmatter title (content-contract violation) and 'fabricated risk' self-diagnostic phrasing per register-documentation.yaml; Ring 1/Ring 2 service assignments consistent with the already-verified three-ring-architecture.md finding; register-clean EN+ES
@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ quality: complete last_edited: 2026-08-06 --- # os-totebox: The Sovereign WORM Data Vault (Intended Design) **Status (2026-08-06):** the seL4 Microkit image described in this article has moved from planned to live-verified. A real boot of the image is confirmed, with end-to-end inference round-trips confirmed working — the capability-graph and Protection-Domain @@ -49,8 +47,8 @@ vault, and are load-bearing for anyone evaluating the design today: this baseline. The WORM ledger runs, but no external anchor and no signature currently attach to its checkpoints. None of this is a fabricated risk — it is the current, factual state of the deployed build. The boot and inference verification above is real and current; the vault's These are the deployed build's current, factual limits. The boot and inference verification above is real and current; the vault's persistence, availability, and ledger-anchoring guarantees are not yet delivered. Every organisation that relies on a third-party platform to store its records is making an implicit wager: that the platform provider will remain solvent, accessible, and free of security failures for as long as those records matter. [[os-totebox]] is designed for operators who have decided that wager is unacceptable.