os-totebox: the sovereign WORM data vault
Track-B documentation wave: systems category — R2/R8 personal-name redaction (os-workplace), R1 infrastructure exposure (IP/ports/paths), named coverage gap, 2 MERGE, mechanical frontmatter fixes
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ short_description: "os-totebox is designed to become a Type I bare-metal OS buil audience: vendor-public bcsc_class: forward-looking language: en language_protocol: PROSE-TOPIC index_group: the-archive-layer paired_with: os-totebox-sovereign-archive.es.md category: systems @@ -32,24 +33,11 @@ confirmed today only at the boot-and-inference layer described here. ## Known limitations (2026-08-06) Three gaps are open against this article's own positioning as a persistent sovereign vault, and are load-bearing for anyone evaluating the design today: - **Storage is not yet persistent.** The deployed guest's virtio-blk storage device is never actually mounted. A guest reboot wipes all data — a direct, current gap against the "persistent WORM vault" positioning this article argues for. - **Graceful shutdown is broken.** Shutdown via QMP (QEMU Machine Protocol) is documented as broken: the guest has no ACPI or power-button device to receive a shutdown request. Redeploys currently hard-kill the guest, with no checkpoint guarantee at the moment of kill. - **Nothing anchors or signs the ledger yet.** The integrity-anchoring companion service has been failing since 2026-08-01, and checkpoint signing is deliberately left unset at this baseline. The WORM ledger runs, but no external anchor and no signature currently attach to its checkpoints. These are the deployed build's current, factual limits. The boot and inference verification above is real and current; the vault's persistence, availability, and ledger-anchoring guarantees are not yet delivered. These same limitations — storage not yet persistent, graceful shutdown broken, nothing anchoring or signing the ledger yet — are load-bearing for anyone evaluating the design today. Rather than restate them here, see [[totebox-os]]'s own **"A known limitation — data persistence inside the seL4 guest"** section for the canonical, single-sourced version of this fact. Every organisation that relies on a third-party platform to store its records is making an implicit wager: that the platform provider will remain solvent, accessible, and free of security failures for as long as those records matter. [[totebox-os]] is designed for operators who have decided that wager is unacceptable.