Data sovereignty and zero-state telemetry
Rewrite data-sovereignty-telemetry.md body (EN+ES) to describe real current behavior — no IP masking, flagged as known gap, per operator direction
@@ -3,59 +3,49 @@ schema: foundry-doc-v1 type: topic content_type: topic slug: data-sovereignty-telemetry short_description: "The platform collects only anonymized, IP-masked geospatial telemetry with no personally identifiable information retained, disclosed on public-facing interfaces." short_description: "The platform's telemetry architecture today: what is actually collected, how it is used, and a known gap against the zero-state design it is intended to reach." title: "Data sovereignty and zero-state telemetry" audience: vendor-public bcsc_class: current-fact bcsc_class: forward-looking language: en paired_with: data-sovereignty-telemetry.es.md last_edited: 2026-07-30 category: security --- **Major correction (2026-07-30) — active compliance-relevant discrepancy, not just an architecture description gap:** this article makes a public GDPR/PIPEDA compliance claim — that IP masking is "applied at receipt," dropping the final octet before any record is written, so "the platform never holds the full address." The real ingestion code contradicts this directly. `app-mediakit-telemetry/src/bin/telemetry-daemon.rs` reads the `x-forwarded-for` header verbatim and appends the **full, unmasked** IP address — together with the raw timestamp, requested URI, and full user-agent string — to a plaintext CSV file (`assets/ledger_telemetry.csv`), with no octet-dropping or masking logic anywhere in the function. The downstream `omni-matrix-engine.rs` then performs a MaxMind GeoIP lookup directly against that same full, unmasked `std::net::IpAddr` (`ip_addr.parse()` at line 204) — a masked address (final octet zeroed) would not resolve to a useful lookup, so the current design depends on holding the complete address, the opposite of the article's claim. No cookie-related code was checked as part of this pass (out of scope for this finding); the IP-masking claim specifically is what this correction addresses. **Flagged as a live compliance/privacy discrepancy, not resolved unilaterally** — this touches a real, publicly disclosed privacy posture claim, not just an internal architecture description, so it is being escalated to Command/project-totebox by mailbox in addition to this callout, per this archive's standing practice for legal/compliance/anonymization content (draft conservative, flag, never silently resolve). [[pointsav-overview|PointSav]] platform interfaces operate on a zero-state telemetry architecture: no personally identifiable information (PII) is collected, no tracking cookies are deployed, and no session state is retained. Operational metrics are limited to anonymized, IP-masked geospatial signals used for infrastructure auditing. Operators in regulated industries gain a public-facing posture consistent with GDPR, PIPEDA, and equivalent data-minimisation requirements, without requiring cookie-consent frameworks. See also [[sovereign-telemetry|sovereign telemetry]] and [[telemetry-architecture|the telemetry architecture]]. **Major correction (2026-07-30):** this article previously described a live, in-force IP-masking mechanism ("the final octet is dropped before the record is written") and framed the platform's telemetry posture as a present-tense GDPR/PIPEDA-compliant zero-state architecture. Verified directly against the real ingestion code (`app-mediakit-telemetry/src/bin/telemetry-daemon.rs`, `omni-matrix-engine.rs`): no masking exists anywhere in the pipeline today. The body below has been rewritten to describe current behavior accurately, rather than the originally intended design. Escalated to Command/project-totebox by mailbox (`command-20260730-active-privacy- compliance-discrepancy-se`) given the compliance stakes — not resolved unilaterally. This rewrite reflects only what was verified about IP handling; the no-cookie and no-session-state claims below were not independently re-checked in this pass and are carried forward from the original article as previously stated, not re-verified. [[pointsav-overview|PointSav]]'s stated design goal is a zero-state telemetry architecture — no personally identifiable information retained, no tracking cookies, no session state. **That goal is not fully met today.** The real ingestion pipeline currently records the requester's full, unmasked IP address, timestamp, requested URI, and user-agent string for every request — the opposite of the masked, anonymized signal this article previously claimed. This is a known gap against the intended design, not a currently-accurate compliance posture. See also [[sovereign-telemetry|sovereign telemetry]] and [[telemetry-architecture|the telemetry architecture]]. ## Key Takeaways - Zero-state means no PII, no cookies, no session retention. A user visiting a public interface leaves no individual record — only a masked geospatial signal. - IP masking is applied at receipt, not post-storage. The final octet is dropped before the record is written; the platform never holds the full address. - No cookie-consent banner is required because no tracking cookies are deployed. There is nothing to consent to. - All public-facing interfaces append a machine-readable privacy disclosure to their legal blocks. This is a current-state architectural fact, not a planned feature. ## No-cookie infrastructure - The intended design is zero-state: no PII, no cookies, no session retention. **The IP-handling piece of that design is not implemented today** — see below. - No IP masking currently occurs. The full IP address is written to a plaintext record as received; it is not dropped, truncated, or anonymized at any point in the pipeline. - No cookie-consent banner is currently displayed; the platform's public-facing interfaces do not appear to deploy tracking cookies (carried forward from the original article, not independently re-verified this pass). - Any disclosure text describing this system's privacy posture in present tense should be treated as describing the *intended* design until the IP-masking gap closes, not the system as it runs today. The platform prohibits tracking cookies, persistent local-storage tracking, and third-party analytics integrations. Public-facing interfaces carry no third-party analytics scripts, eliminating the legal obligation to present cookie-consent banners under ePrivacy and equivalent regimes. ## What the pipeline actually does today ## Geospatial anonymisation protocol The real ingestion path is `app-mediakit-telemetry/src/bin/telemetry-daemon.rs`: it reads the `x-forwarded-for` header verbatim off each incoming request and appends the full IP address — together with the raw timestamp, requested URI, and full user-agent string — to a plaintext CSV file (`assets/ledger_telemetry.csv`). No octet-dropping, truncation, or hashing occurs anywhere in this function. A downstream process, `omni-matrix-engine.rs`, then performs a MaxMind GeoIP lookup directly against that same full IP address to derive coarse geographic signal for usage reporting — a masked address (e.g. final octet zeroed) would not resolve to a useful lookup, so the pipeline's current design actively depends on holding the complete address rather than incidentally retaining it. Operational metrics are gathered through a first-party ping architecture. The ingestion server applies mandatory IP masking — the final octet of the incoming IP address is dropped at receipt (for example, `192.168.1.45` becomes `192.168.1.0`). The resulting record is a coarse geospatial signal with no network-level identification. Interaction data — such as document-access events — is used to audit infrastructure security and measure platform usage patterns; no record is tied to an individual identity. ## Known gap and remediation ## Mandatory regulatory disclosure Closing this gap — so the system actually matches the zero-state design intent — requires either masking the IP before persistence (accepting coarser geolocation) or restructuring the GeoIP step to work from an already-masked value. Neither has been implemented as of this writing. This is flagged to the team that owns `app-mediakit-telemetry` as a real remediation item, not merely a documentation correction — the underlying system, not just this article, needs to change before the zero-state claim can be made accurately again. All public-facing interfaces append the following disclosure to their legal blocks: ## Regulatory disclosure — treat as intent, not current state > "Digital Infrastructure and Privacy Posture: This interface operates on a zero-execution and zero-state telemetry architecture. It does not deploy tracking cookies, retain session states, or harvest personally identifiable information. System interactions are limited to the collection of anonymised, masked network routing data strictly for the purpose of auditing infrastructure security and verifying document access." Some public-facing interfaces may carry disclosure language describing this system in zero-state, masked terms. Until the gap above closes, any such disclosure should be understood as describing the platform's intended posture, not a currently accurate technical claim — this wiki does not reproduce that disclosure text here in order to avoid restating a claim known to be inaccurate today. ## See also